After a wild night that saw one three-team blockbuster deal go up in flames so that another could be born, the Boston Celtics, Washington Wizards, and Memphis Grizzlies have completed a relatively significant trade that could affect next season’s title chase. The particulars: Boston receives Kristaps Porzingis and two first-round draft picks, Memphis gets Marcus Smart, and Washington lands Tyus Jones, Danilo Gallinari, Mike Muscala, and a second-round pick.
The 30,000-foot-view assessment of all this chaos is that all participants walk away with something they needed. But let’s start with the biggest and most shocking loss. The Celtics are saying goodbye to their longest-tenured player, a polarizing, singular Defensive Player of the Year–winning floor general whose contributions often transcend statistical evaluation. Smart was Boston’s heartbeat, the type of leader whose jersey would have someday been raised in the rafters had he ever won a title in the city that drafted him.
The Offer Sheet
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The Celtics made the playoffs in all nine of his seasons. And in all nine seasons, they were never outscored per possession with him on the court. “I think toughness, generally, is difficult to quantify,” Brad Stevens said in 2016. “Everybody brings their own levels of skill to the table and everything else, but you have to have a competitiveness and an ability to figure out a way to win that possession. And he’s able to do that on a lot of possessions.”
Smart isn’t without faults (erratic decision-making, an iffy outside shot, a body that’s gradually slowing down), but replacing all he did—particularly as one of the league’s most versatile and tenacious defenders in a switch-almost-everything system—won’t be easy.
Boston’s return was plenty fair (Two firsts? In this economy?), but the impetus of the deal was less about bettering a championship-caliber basketball team than about managing a looming financial strain brought on by the NBA’s draconian collective bargaining agreement. But by exchanging the $41 million Smart had left on his deal after next season for Porzingis’s expiring contract, Boston has cut costs and infused itself with some more flexibility (it owns all its draft picks) while forming a balanced, humongous, and über-talented team.
In Porzingis, the Celtics land a stretch big with All-Star chops who can space the floor, accentuate Jayson Tatum, Jaylen Brown, and Derrick White with dribble handoffs and pick-and-rolls, and insure (in the short term, and possibly beyond next season) Al Horford and Rob Williams III. He makes a lot of sense for a guard-heavy team that was thin up front.
Offensively, Stevens has coveted this archetype, be it Luke Kornet, Muscala, or Gallinari, tall, skilled centers who can’t be ignored behind the 3-point line. Porzingis is far and away the most talented version Boston has had. He turns 28 in August and is coming off one of his best seasons: a career high in scoring average (23.2 per game), field goal percentage (49.8), effective field goal percentage (56.5), and true shooting percentage (62.7).
According to Second Spectrum, Porzingis’s quantified shooter impact was plus-8.28 and his quantified shotmaking was plus-5.39 last season. That ranked 10th and first, respectively, among all players who took at least 1,000 field goals. Translation: He made way more shots than he was expected to. That means either that he’s established a new normal, or that he’s in for a downturn. The fact that Porzingis made only 30.77 percent of his uncontested 3s last season suggests that Boston would be wise to bank on Porzingis sustaining that performance—in an offense where he’ll spend plenty of time as the third or fourth option and will be able to operate against defenses that are more concerned with Tatum and Brown.
The Celtics are also betting on Porzingis’s good health. Porzingis crossed the 2,000-minute threshold last year for the first time since he tore his ACL in 2018. This is a major deal. When he’s on the court, his team’s offense chars the opposition. Porzingis just finished 18th in estimated plus-minus and 20th in real plus-minus. At his best, which was on display at times last season, Porzingis is basically unguardable: He’s 7-foot-3 and has a high release that makes perfect contests seem pointless. He combines adequate handle with intricate footwork, creating room seemingly whenever he wants.
Without the ball, Porzingis can be a spot-up threat, curl into the paint off a wide pindown, and make a trailing 28-footer look like a free throw. The options are endless. Boston can create mismatches all over the floor by having wings and guards set down screens for KP that force help, unwanted switches, and confusion.
Coming off a season in which Boston finished second in 3-point rate and sixth in 3-point accuracy, the team’s spacing will be even better, with more ways to diversify if and when its offense bogs down in crunch time. For example: Last year, the Wizards generated 125.3 points per 100 direct plays when Porzingis had a post-up. That was the third-best mark in the league among all players who averaged at least two post-ups per game (only DeMar DeRozan and Nikola Jokic were ahead).
Porzingis isn’t a genius-level passer or even someone strong enough to bulldoze smaller defenders into the stanchion. But he has a habit of making extremely difficult shots look effortless, whether he’s facing up from 15 feet or, with his back to the basket, using shot and shoulder fakes to set his man up for a soft fallaway. When he’s patient and in rhythm, he’s harder to guard one-on-one than most bigs:
When help comes, either against a defense that switches and then sends a hard double-team or after he draws two defenders on a drive to the rim, Porzingis calmly makes some difficult reads:
There were 47 players who set at least 1,000 ball screens last season. Washington manufactured 1.23 points per possession when Porzingis set a screen, which ranked first out of those 47. On direct plays, when the screen directly led to a shot or a pass led to a shot, Porzingis finished second in efficiency. Fourth was Draymond Green, fifth was Jokic, and sixth was Joel Embiid.
Boston’s ball handlers will appreciate the advantages Porzingis can create for them out of the pick-and-roll, whether he’s popping out for a 3, rolling into a post-up, or diving all the way to the rim. (Guarding the Celtics will be a headache when he sets a pick closer to midcourt.)
Boston can also kick-start possessions by having him set a stagger screen with Timelord or Horford. One pops, one rolls, and the set develops from there. On paper, they’ll be a nightmare to stop. In reality, there are questions about who will play with whom, and when. Would Joe Mazzulla prefer Porzingis as his sixth man or starting power forward? If the latter, would Williams start beside him? Will Horford come off the bench? Will Porzingis close in clutch situations? Will Malcolm Brogdon be over his bench role, healthy, or, like, even on the team?
Tactically, finding ways to feature Porzingis instead of solely using him as a complementary piece will take time. But ironing out chemistry issues is what the regular season is for. He was excellent on the Mavericks before a meniscus injury derailed his career in 2020. A personality clash with Luka Doncic didn’t help, but, again, health is what really matters here.
And a lot of those aforementioned questions will be answered by how quickly Boston’s defense can coalesce. The Celtics aren’t going to be switching everything anymore with Smart gone and Porzingis in the door, but KP is a solid drop defender who plays a decent cat-and-mouse game. He moves his feet, bats at the ball, and is quick enough to come up pretty high on the floor. Boston is long and smart enough to shrink the floor, fight over and under screens, contest shots, and do whatever it can to make sure Porzingis isn’t out on an island or forced to guard in space.
What the one-time All-Star lacks in strength he makes up for with a 7-foot-6 wingspan, which is longer than just about everyone else’s in the league. Last year, there were 210 players who were the closest defender on at least 200 shots in the paint. Out of those 210, only Jaren Jackson Jr., Anthony Davis, Draymond Green, Nic Claxton, and Royce O’Neale helped hold opponents to a lower field goal percentage than 42 percent, the rate players shot when Porzingis was nearby.
This is nice, though some luck is certainly involved. He isn’t feared at the cup, and is less an imposing shot blocker than someone who prefers to avoid fouls with valiant attempts at verticality. The Celtics will be fine so long as Porzingis actually makes multiple efforts on defense. For years his energy has waned when he’s away from the ball, when he needs to rotate before a pass gets where the offense wants it to go. On average, the Knicks, Mavericks, and Wizards have all struggled on defense when Porzingis is at the 5. If the Celtics reverse that trend and get the same player Washington had last season, they’ll be back in the conference finals, at least.
Don’t be shocked if Memphis joins them on the other side of the bracket. When Ja Morant returns from his 25-game suspension, the Grizzlies will roll him out with Smart, Desmond Bane, Jackson, and Steven Adams. That is a hellacious defense with three good to great playmakers and peak toughness. Memphis just traded Jones and moved on from Dillon Brooks. In a lot of ways, Smart is those two players in one body. At 29, he’s a bit advanced for the Morant, JJJ, and Bane timeline, but patience and the long view work for only so long. At some point, the Grizzlies needed to take a swing and infuse their homegrown core with a player who can elevate what they do on both ends.
On offense, Smart doesn’t naturally complement Morant. But they’ll make it work. He’s a better shooter than most think—36 percent on 6.6 3s per game over the last three postseasons is not bad—and he doesn’t stop moving when the ball isn’t in his hands. They can collaborate directly in the pick-and-roll (small-small screening actions were a staple in Boston), especially if opponents stick a larger defender on Morant or try to hide a big on Smart. Small lineups that feature Luke Kennard will be fun. Larger lineups that let Smart be the point guard when Morant isn’t available will cause physical pain for opponents.
On defense, it’ll be scary hours. Brooks just made an All-Defensive team and assumed some of the toughest on-ball assignments every night. Smart can replace that but then also wreak havoc elsewhere, always communicating in transition, flying across the paint to protect the rim, taking charges, drawing fouls, and jumping passing lanes. It’s an upgrade. Barring injury, there’s no reason this shouldn’t be the top defense in the NBA next season.
And then there’s the identity fit. Memphis is desperate for a professional veteran with playoff experience who can introduce some critical leadership qualities to a young locker room that veered off course last year. Smart can only help as a voice in Morant’s ear. If one of last year’s rookies takes a step forward and proves himself capable behind the arc, Memphis may find itself making a deep playoff run.
The same can’t be said for the Wizards, a team that wants to be very bad immediately and is doing whatever it can to make that happen. It’s the only rebuilding team in this trade, so it’s not great that Washington didn’t get either of the first-round picks that changed hands. But it’s interesting that the Wizards landed Jones; they can either keep him as a stopgap point guard or flip him for more assets.
If Porzingis had opted out of his contract, they would’ve explored sign-and-trade opportunities and then, if none were viable, they would have been OK letting him go for nothing. Instead, they get some draft equity back, which is what they would’ve eventually asked for in a universe where KP stayed put.
On the whole, this trade nudged all the participants in the direction they want to go. At the same time, all three are probably looking at themselves in the mirror, realizing they have a lot more work to do over the next few weeks.
