Not long after being hired as the new head coach of the Seahawks last year, Mike Macdonald made some interior design changes to the team headquarters. The basketball hoop in the auditorium—an unofficial symbol of the Pete Carroll era—was removed, as were a bunch of wall-sized photos depicting great moments from the previous 14 years, a decision that rankled fans and a few former star players. My initial reaction to this scandal was to hand-wave the debates over VMAC decorations as overwrought offseason nonsense, but in retrospect, I probably should’ve been paying more attention to some clear foreshadowing.
Over the weekend, Seattle took that training facility remodel to the next level by trading away or releasing three of its best (and most famous) remaining Carroll-era leaders, dealing starting quarterback Geno Smith to Carroll’s Raiders, sending star receiver DK Metcalf to the Steelers, and releasing stalwart pass catcher Tyler Lockett. Together with the three-year, $100.5 million deal the team is set to give to former Vikings quarterback Sam Darnold, these moves represent a break from any lingering influence of the Carroll Way—and more importantly, they establish a tangible clean-slate vibe for a franchise in flux.
For better or worse, this is now, truly, Macdonald and GM John Schneider’s team. The big question is whether this flurry of moves actually makes a Seahawks team that won 10 games last season, you know, better.
A lot of dominoes still must fall before we have a real answer to that question. But there’s no way around the fact that the Seahawks unloaded two of their best players in Smith and Metcalf—and now must quickly reset with Darnold at the helm. Seattle got a second-rounder this year for Metcalf, plus a third-rounder for Smith, and now holds five picks inside the top 100 in April’s draft. That extra capital (in both picks and cap space) gives the team’s brain trust some ammo to fill obvious holes on the roster, most notably on the offensive line and at receiver. But Schneider and Macdonald need to make those picks count, quickly, which is anything but a given. And as of the time I’m writing this, they have yet to use that newfound cap space to sign a starter-caliber lineman or pass catcher in free agency, letting some of the names that were bandied about in Seahawks land—Drew Dalman, Will Fries, Patrick Mekari, DeAndre Hopkins, and a handful of others—sign with other teams.
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So, for now, I’d imagine that a contingent of Seahawks fans feel like I do, that the team not only got worse at quarterback in going from Smith to Darnold, but also seems to be setting up its new signal caller to fail by dropping him in behind a bad offensive line, without Metcalf and with just one quality receiver in Jaxon Smith-Njigba. That’s obviously the less than optimistic view. But if I squint, I can almost make out a cogent plan here for the Seahawks, who are moving from a soon-to-be 35-year-old quarterback in Smith to a younger, probably cheaper (given the extension that Smith will likely get from the Raiders) option in the 27-year-old Darnold. The former Viking, critically, brings some added theoretical upside. There’s the potential that he’ll continue his development, build on his strong 2024 season, and emerge as Seattle’s longer-term franchise QB. The Seahawks likely also see Darnold as a better fit for incoming offensive coordinator Klint Kubiak’s scheme, which has plenty of similarities to Kevin O’Connell’s offense in Minnesota.
And while I’d posit that the eye test shows Smith is a better and more accurate quarterback than Darnold, I don’t want to overstate the gulf between the two, either. Darnold undoubtedly had a strong supporting cast in Minnesota, with O’Connell as the play caller; Justin Jefferson, Jordan Addison, and TJ Hockenson as playmakers downfield; and a superior offensive line to protect him. That context is key. But he bested Smith in touchdowns (35 to 21), adjusted yards per attempt (8.2 to 7.0), QBR (60.4 to 53.8), passer rating (102.5 to 93.2), and expected points added per dropback (0.06 to 0.03). The two threw for a nearly identical amount of yards (and both averaged exactly 254 pass yards per game in the regular season), and both were aggressive downfield passers (Darnold finished fourth in the NFL last year with 34 big-time throws, per PFF, slightly ahead of Smith, who ranked sixth with 28). And while Darnold’s late-season collapse is what most people remember (and I will get to that), he was also clutch at times for the Vikings. Darnold notched three fourth-quarter comebacks last season (tied for fifth most) compared to Smith’s four (tied for second), and he notched five game-winning drives (second) compared to Smith’s four (tied for fourth).
Both quarterbacks were also annoyingly turnover prone. Darnold turned the ball over 16 times (tied for fourth most), compared to Geno’s 15 (seventh). Darnold’s turnover-worthy play rate (3.7 percent) ranked 30th among the 40 quarterbacks with 200-plus dropbacks, per PFF, while Smith ranked 15th (at 2.7 percent). They both take a lot of sacks, too: Smith was sacked 50 times (third worst, behind only Caleb Williams and C.J. Stroud), and Darnold wasn’t far behind, taking 48 sacks. Darnold’s numbers under pressure last year were better, per PFF. He tallied an 84.1 passer rating while tossing 13 touchdowns compared to six picks, while Smith tossed seven touchdowns compared to 13 picks and had a 60.5 passer rating.
The fact that Darnold turned into a pumpkin late in the season, though, is the massive, unavoidable red flag. The Vikings suffered a Week 18 shellacking by the Lions and then were thoroughly dominated in their wild-card matchup with the Rams: Darnold completed a combined 43 of 81 attempts (53 percent), with just one touchdown, a pick, and a lost fumble in those two games. He averaged a measly 5.1 yards per attempt. He took 11 sacks. He was off target on a whopping 21 percent of his throws (!!) and tallied a success rate of just 29 percent. Oh God, my eyes! Don’t look, Seahawks fans. Try not to think about it.
Those two games are likely why Darnold is no longer a Viking, though, and why he came at a relative discount. The full details of his contract haven’t yet been released, but reports state that the Seahawks gave him a three-year contract worth $100.5 million, with $55 million in guarantees. That $33.3 million average value per year would rank 18th among quarterbacks, as would his total in guarantees. Is Darnold approximately the 18th-best quarterback in the NFL? I’d say sure, he’s in that ballpark. Anyway, if he ends up being far worse than that, and this whole plan goes to hell, the Seahawks should, at least, be able to quickly get out of the contract, eat the dead money, and move on with their lives.
It’s worth noting that there’s an alternate reading of the entire situation, one that paints a picture of the Seahawks front office heading into free agency hoping to keep both Smith and Metcalf and maintain the status quo on offense. According to reports, both Metcalf and Smith requested trades after contract talks broke down—and in this scenario, the Seahawks may have felt they’d exhausted all avenues to retain their two key players at a reasonable cost. But it’s also notable that Schneider and Macdonald quickly, almost insultingly so, complied with both trade requests. And thus, alea jacta est.
In any case, one could argue that trading away your 10-win team’s established starting quarterback (Smith) in favor of an outside guy (Darnold) who theoretically better fits your new, unproven offensive coordinator’s (Kubiak’s) scheme may amount to bad process. And it’s indisputable that the Seahawks’ shake-up represents a massive gamble for both Schneider, who finally has full control over the roster, and Macdonald, who still has much to prove as an NFL head coach. It feels eminently plausible that this will all blow up in their faces.
But I also respect the Seahawks’ audacity and decisiveness over the past few days. After all, moving on from an established starter in Russell Wilson a few years back aged shockingly well for this franchise. There’s plenty of future upside to be seen in the Seahawks’ big bet. But for Darnold to become the team’s long-term starter—or at the very least, come close to matching Smith’s impact under center in the short term—he’s going to need a much stronger supporting cast around him. The only way the Seahawks will come away as winners from their Darnold experiment is if they can quickly parlay their newly acquired draft picks and swelling cap space coffers into impact players on the offensive line and in their pass catching corps. That’s a tough needle that Schneider and Macdonald have to thread. We’ve recently seen teams like the Rams and Eagles rebuild deteriorating units seemingly overnight (defensive line and secondary, respectively), combining savvy moves and quality coaching to remain competitive, so it won’t totally shock me if the Seahawks can pull it off. But considering Seattle’s long-established inability to fix its offensive line, and the relative lack of blue-chip receiver talent in both free agency and the draft, I’m not going to be holding my breath.
